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Introduction 
 
 In the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States 
declared a Texas law, which criminalized most abortions, unconstitutional, seemingly paving the 
way for a definitive countrywide legalization of this particularly sensitive medical procedure. 
Yet 44 years later, neither the American people nor the courts can resolve the countless 
controversies surrounding female reproductive rights. Since its legalization, 38 cases relating to 
reproductive health have reached the Supreme Court, every time failing to quell the concerns of 
those on either side of the debate. This conflict arises from the fact that the issue of reproductive 
rights highlights deeply embedded social, political and constitutional clashes in the American 
framework. This difficult discussion raises questions regarding the division of state and federal 
powers, the separation of church and state and most importantly, the conflicting interpretations 
of fundamental Constitutional principles, most notably that of the First Amendment.  
Those disappointed by the outcome of Roe v. Wade vowed to fight the decision. 
However, to their dismay, the Supreme Court has largely upheld the tenets of the 1973 case. 
Moreover, many pro-life advocates undertook an active role in deterring women who plan to 
terminate their pregnancies by utilizing their First Amendment privileges, which give the 
American people the freedoms of speech, religion, and association. This amendment proves 
essential to the American ideal of a government created “by the people, for the people” because 
it provides a way for ordinary citizens to protest a tyrannical rule. Anti-abortion activists viewed 
this federal ruling as a transgression of appropriate judicial power, so they responded by using 
their power of speech and “clinic-front anti-abortion protests grew in frequency, magnitude, and 
intensity” (Wilson 2). These demonstrators, largely peaceful, stand outside clinics that offer 
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reproductive health services, such as Planned Parenthood, and offer literature that argue the case 
for life to women. 
Abortion providers and their supporters began to claim that the protestors outside clinics 
intentionally blocked doorways and harassed women attempting to enter the facilities, rather than 
simply offering pamphlets to women who expressed interest. Therefore, many legislatures 
introduced the idea of buffer zone laws, which “limit how close demonstrators are allowed to be 
from a facility by requiring that protests occur at a specific distance from a facility” (“Buffer 
Zones”). In defense of this type of legislation, which may seem to infringe upon an individual’s 
civil right of free speech, precedent does exist to limit First Amendment privileges in certain 
circumstances. In a 1989 free speech case entitled Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme 
Court established a codified list of criteria used to determine whether a government’s legislative 
effort to limit the guaranteed First Amendment right of speech holds up constitutionally. 
According to the Opinion of the Court, the restrictive legislation must not favor a certain 
viewpoint, serve a significant government interest, be precise in serving that interest, and leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication (Anthony Kennedy Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism). Therefore, acting upon the belief that their states had a significant interest in protecting 
its clinics from protesters, legislatures around the country began creating buffer zone laws in 
compliance with Ward v. Rock Against Racism.  
These new restrictions did not stop demonstrators in their tracks because the last section 
of the First Amendment ensures that United States citizens have the right to “petition the 
government” if they perceive any encroachment upon their rights. Therefore, pro-life advocates 
began a 20-year quest to end these buffer zone laws by challenging their constitutionality in the 
American Court System. To date, three of these cases have reached the Supreme Court. Initially, 
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the nation’s most important judges appeared supportive of these laws, designed to protect the 
interests of patients. This judicial backing is evident in the cases of Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center and Hill v. Colorado. In both instances, the Court asserted that establishing limits to the 
scope of protest outside of abortions clinics complies with the requirements set forth in Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism  
 In 2013, the state of Massachusetts argued the case of McMullen v. Coakley in front of 
the Supreme Court. Similarly to the aforementioned cases in Florida and Colorado, pro-life 
protesters challenged the legality of buffer zones because the legislation impeded them from 
adequately exercising their First Amendment privileges. All lower courts rejected the 
demonstrators’ claims, in line with precedent. Pro-life advocates then appealed to the Nation’s 
highest court. In a seemingly unexpected turn of events, the justices decided, unanimously, 
against the Commonwealth and in favor of the protesters. This court judgment determined that 
the interest of Massachusetts did not justify the infringement upon the demonstrators’ right to 
free speech, which left an uncertain future for buffer zone laws in other states.  
 Comparing the starkly different decision in McCullen v. Coakley to its predecessors 
presents itself as a peculiar puzzle in desperate need of explanation. Adding to the enigmatic 
nature of these cases, no easy answer existed to account for this judicial ideological shift. For 
instance, no major personnel changes occurred on the Court and no singular event took place that 
might lead to a universal adjustment in understanding. I first argue that the decision in McCullen 
v. Coakley differs from the cases of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center and Hill v. Colorado 
because the Supreme Court, as an institutional entity, increased the bar by which the government 
can curb its citizens’ right to free speech. In its history, the Supreme Court allowed the 
curtailment of free speech, if “the restriction serves to promote a compelling [governmental] 
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interest” (Ruane 1). The attitudinal shift I propose in First Amendment thinking makes it more 
difficult for states to prove the existence of compelling interest in a manner that adequately 
convinces the Supreme Court of the need for governmental constraints on speech. This type of 
change in interpretation surrounding the First Amendment would naturally have greater 
implications on the future of speech. Particularly, the country might see an increased frequency 
of vitriolic, targeted and belligerent speech, especially in today’s tense political climate where 
the passions of the people seem exceptionally enflamed. 
 In the oral arguments of McCullen v Coakley, the justices and the lawyers debated the 
extent by which state governments can act upon their perceived compelling interests, new 
questions arose regarding the relationship between state governments and an independent 
judiciary. An analysis of these cases provides substantial insight into how state governments 
create more localized laws. I argue that state and local governments do not legislate in a vacuum 
with only the desires of their constituency in mind. The Court has ways to exert its influence 
upon the states and they in turn often create laws with federal understanding in mind, relying on 
cases and precedents set by the federal Judiciary. This idea adds a dimension to the traditional 
understanding of federalism, “a system of government in which entities such as states or 
provinces share power with a national government” (“Federalism”) Federalism serves as a 
foundational principle of the American governmental structure. Federal influence upon the ways 
a state governs indicates a power imbalance between the states and the nation. This concept 
suggests that when laws change on a more local level, the ideological shift actually began in the 
Federal Government. Since McCullen v. Coakley, the decision to stop the restriction of speech at 
abortion clinics in Massachusetts has influenced local laws around the country, in accordance to 
the Court’s outlook as specified in the Opinion of the Court. Therefore, in coming years, if the 
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Supreme Court continues to exhibit similar ideology as put forth in McCullen v. Coakley, I 
predict a declining frequency in the creation of protective laws for reproductive health clinics in 
traditionally liberal states, because while claiming to govern according to the will of their 
constituents, the direction of state laws actually depends on the ideological direction of federal 
governance. Therefore, the federal government, particularly the judiciary, is the initial incitement 
for changes in local codes and measures, creating a singular course for all American citizens, 
regardless of which state they call home. 
Literature Review 
 
Scholars continue to debate the effects of the Judicial Branch on its legislative 
counterpart, especially in terms of policy-making, but most Political Scientists agree that the 
Supreme Court exercises a certain influence on Congress. As an illustration, Robert Dahl 
believes that “the Court is inevitably a policy-making institution” and that, “Like other political 
institutions, the Court is frequently called upon to select among alternative policies about which 
there is disagreement in society and uncertainty about the consequences of the various choices” 
(Casper 50). Inherent in its role, the Supreme Court rejects or defends policy created by 
legislatures, so Dahl thinks the Supreme Court cannot judge solely based on constitutional 
principles and that preferences for policies naturally factor into the decision-making process.  
My paper adopts the widespread understanding that the Judiciary has a great effect on 
lawmakers. After all, only the greatest legal minds in the country obtain a seat on the bench and 
the judicial branch’s approval ratings consistently outperform that of Congress. The Legislature 
would do itself a disservice not to consider the rulings of the Court. My research focuses on the 
ways in which the Court exerts its influence on lawmakers, particularly in its capacity to grant 
writ of certiorari and its power of judicial review.  
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Keeping in line with the discussion of the relationship between the judiciary and the 
legislative branch, many academics also write about the judiciary’s role in maintaining a 
federalist society. Many of these scholars agree that while past benches avoided limiting the 
federal legislature’s superiority over their local counterparts, the Supreme Court today acts as a 
staunch defender of federalism. John Yoo illustrates this idea when he states that the founding 
fathers “did envision a role for the courts in preserving the balance between state and federal 
power. The Court has rediscovered its proper role in preserving the federalist structure” (Yoo 
197). Vicki Lens writes about this trend when she argued that, “Starting in the mid-1990s and 
accelerating during the Supreme Court’s 1999 term certain legal doctrines of the New-Deal era 
have been resurrected by the Court to invalidate federal legislation” and put control back in the 
hands of the states (Lens 319). Specifically, she argues that the Court increasingly narrowed its 
understanding of the commerce clause, which established federal control over commerce 
between states, because, in the past, Justices used it to “obliterate the distinction between what is 
national and what is local” (Lens 326). Lens also states that the Court “has also begun reining in 
Congress under other parts of the Constitution, including the Tenth, Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments” (Lens 319).  
 Yet, further research into this question indicates that the Supreme Court does not defend, 
but damages, federalism in American society because of the fact that it wields its entrenched 
powers freely over the legislative branch. While most scholars who wrote about Judicial 
influence on lawmakers focused only on Congress, my research analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
powerful effects on state-led legislation. The federal judiciary’s understanding of the American 
Constitution so greatly inspires local lawmakers that it is a clear example of the U.S. 
Government encroaching upon the autonomy of the states, threatening the nation’s federalist 
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society. The ideological change in terms of free speech amongst Supreme Court justices can be 
traced through three cases questioning the constitutionality of buffer-zone laws. Analyzing this 
shift’s impact on state legislation serves as an ideal way to illustrate this breakdown of 
federalism.  
Research Design 
 Insofar as the cases discussed, Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Hill v. Colorado, and 
McCullen v. Coakley serve as the only examples of buffer zones cases debated in front of the 
Supreme Court. These three cases explain the relationship between buffer zones and the Supreme 
Court fully. I did also use Phelps v. Snyder, a free-speech case not related to abortion rights to 
demonstrate that this ideological trend extended beyond buffer zones.  
These cases also happened to serve my puzzle well for a few reasons. To begin, they are 
all from different political climates, each case taking place under a different presidency. In terms 
of the legislative branch, 1994, the year of Madsen, became known as the “Republican 
Revolution” because the GOP took over both houses of Congress. Republicans also held the 
majority in 2000 and 2013. This lack of association with both the legislature and the presidency 
demonstrates that this ideological shift has its intellectual origins elsewhere. For me, this 
discovery opened the door to the idea that this movement began on the bench. In addition the 
time between each case, ten years, allowed me to track Supreme Court thinking over a fairly 
significant amount of time, which gave me an especially comprehensive picture.  
 While a good amount of time exists in between the cases, they are also close enough 
together to have two justices be present in all three arguments: Justice Ginsberg and Justice 
Scalia. The consistency of these two justices helped my research because I could follow their 
first amendment thinking throughout the 20 years between Madsen and McCullen. Additionally, 
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these two particular justices gave me a chance to analyze this shift in First Amendment thinking 
through people on different sides of judicial practice. Justice Ginsberg serves as a reliable liberal 
voice on the bench, who interprets the Constitution as a “living” document and she believes that 
the Founding Fathers intended for future judges to modify its meanings based on new realities. 
Justice Scalia on the other hand identified himself as an “Originalist”, who believed that the 
Constitution must be interpreted as faithfully as possible to the intent of those who wrote it. 
Justices Scalia and Ginsberg allowed me to examine a changing ideology through the 
prospective of two very different judges. The prolific nature of Justice Scalia aided me 
immensely in my research because he wrote dissents in the first two cases and a concurring 
opinion in 2013. Justice Ginsberg did not write an opinion in these three instances, so I tracked 
her ideas in the oral arguments in which she is always very vocal. A justice’s line of questioning 
gives the public an idea of what legal issues are most important to her in a particular case, similar 
to an official Opinion or Dissent.   
 When evaluating the Oral Arguments and Opinions in an attempt to make sense of the 
surprising ruling in McCullen v. Coakley, I paid special attention to the introduction of ideas. 
Legal considerations that play a big role throughout all three cases cannot account for the Court’s 
divergent conclusion in McCullen v. Coakley. However, judicial concepts that newly emerge in 
the later cases could indicate a change. I also studied the Opinions in order to see how much time 
the authors devoted to certain topics. Legal questions that the justices debate extensively 
normally serve as linchpins for the eventual decision. These two strategies allowed for me to 
look at the Opinions and Oral Arguments in a comprehensive manner, making certain that I took 
the entire text into consideration.  
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 As an additional source I interviewed Gabrielle Viator, who worked in the Civil Rights 
Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office during the early phases of the case and 
handled most of the discovery, depositions and negotiations of the agreed-to facts. Before her 
time at the AG’s office, Viator also worked in the Massachusetts State Legislature when the 
buffer zone law was being crafted. Our conversation enhanced almost every part of my research. 
Since she served in the state legislature before the buffer zone existed, she was very familiar with 
the concerns and incidents that led to the creation of this law. She also knew a great deal about 
both federal and state laws that intended to protect access to clinics. Particularly, she understood 
where these pieces of legislation failed and therefore why the women of Massachusetts needed 
the buffer zone law for their security. Since she took the depositions, she also understood how 
Massachusetts crafted its case for the lower courts. She explained to me what precedents they 
turned to in constructing their defense and which legal questions they believed would be most 
important when arguing their case. Finally, based on her knowledge, she revealed her concerns 
for the future of women’s health in Massachusetts in light of the Supreme Court decision.  I refer 
to her insights intermittently throughout the paper when they are most appropriate.  
 I then related my findings to a bigger picture of how the Supreme Court and state 
legislatures interact. How much influence does the Court exert on state legislatures? Does it 
threaten the autonomy of the states? Does it affect a state’s ability to legislate in terms of the will 
of its constituents? Does it prioritize a national preference over a regional one? This part of my 
thesis examines a potential breakdown of American Federalism, which could have consequential 
effects on the future.  
 To examine the actual effects, I read every article about buffer zones in the Boston Globe 
after the McCullen v. Coakley decision since the local newspaper serves as the best source of 
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knowledge on the Massachusetts state legislature. I tracked the outrage following the 
announcement, the discussion about possible alternatives to fill the void and the eventual 
decision to settle for a much less protective law. I also analyzed the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision on other states in the Northeast by reading the relevant local newspapers.   
Counter Arguments 
Judicial Partisanship 
In comparing similar cases with different decisions in a 20-year time period, one might, 
understandably, assume that a personnel shift occurred on the Court that changed its ideological 
make-up. In essay No. 78 of The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton presents his vision of 
federal judges who serve for life, so that they remain immune from the political pressures that 
accompany elections. Hamilton writes that, “The complete independence of the courts of justice 
is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution” (Hamilton). Yet, especially in the last 80 years, 
political polarization, experienced in the other two branches, has spread to the Judiciary. For 
instance, “In the period between 1801 and 1940 2% of all Supreme Court decisions were decided 
by a 5-4 vote. By contrast, Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have seen just over 20% of their cases 
decided by this small margin” (Rodriquez). Assuming that cases today are not more 
constitutionally ambiguous than they were in the past, this statistic indicates that modern 
Supreme Court justices stray from deciding cases only in constitutional terms but succumb to 
political sympathies, pressures and agendas.  
 The divergent outcome in McCullen v. Coakley, especially in comparison to its 
predecessors, cannot be attributed to judicial partisanship. In 1994, when the Court decided 
against the pro-life protesters at a health clinic in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Ginsberg 
served as the only Justice on the court appointed by a Democrat. Additionally, the Republican-
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appointed Chief Justice wrote the Opinion of the Court defending the law protecting Florida’s 
reproductive health facilities. Meanwhile in 2013, when the Court ruled unanimously in favor of 
the protestors at the abortion clinic in McCullen v. Coakley, Justices Kagen, Sotomayor and 
Breyer joined Ginsberg to create a more formidable liberal bloc on the Supreme Court. Yet, an 
undeniably more progressive bench did not influence the court’s decision in the Massachusetts 
case, rejecting the notion that these cases were decided by partisan influences. 
 In order to further rebuke the idea that partisanship explains the shift in ideology in 
regards to free speech and reproductive rights, I traced Justice Ginsburg’s judgments in these 
specific reproductive health cases. In 1994, in the case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, she 
signed on to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Opinion of the Court, in which he wrote,  “On balance, 
we hold that the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway burdens no more 
speech than necessary to accomplish the governmental interest at stake”, upholding the 
constitutionality of Florida’s law (Rehnquist Madsen v. Women’s Health Center). Additionally, 
in Hill v. Colorado, decided by the Court only six years later, Ginsberg signed on to Justice 
Steven’s Opinion of the Court, which agreed with Madsen on the legalities of the buffer zone. 
Meanwhile, when evaluating the Massachusetts law only 13 years later, Ginsberg signed on to 
Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion of the Court, which clearly upended years of precedent by 
declaring that the Commonwealth pursued its interests “by the extreme step of closing a 
substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers. It has done so without seriously 
addressing the problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for tis time-honored 
purposes. The Commonwealth may not do that consistent with the First Amendment” (Roberts 
McCullen v. Coakley). If Ginsberg can rule so differently in these respective cases, the reasoning 
behind the differing decisions cannot be explained by fixed political preferences.  
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Differences in Laws 
Some may say that every law has different specificities that might make the Supreme 
Court uphold or invalidate it, regardless of its constitutional questions. While I recognize that 
this idea may serve as a potential contributing explanation to this paradox, it remains by no 
means sufficient. The Court failed to acknowledge that the Massachusetts law, a fixed 35-foot 
buffer zone with no other hidden regulations, did not deviate from the legal details codified by its 
predecessors. For instance in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the court upheld Florida’s 
injunction for a fixed 36-Foot Buffer Zone. Therefore, the legal technicalities within the statute 
cannot help to comprehensively and effectively resolve the surprisingly unanimous conclusion in 
McCullen v. Coakley. 
Evaluating the Three Cases 
The judicial ideological shift makes it more difficult for governments to restrict the 
American populace’s guaranteed right of free speech under the case of compelling interest. This 
change is evident through the cases of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Hill v. Colorado, and 
McCullen v. Coakley. 
Approaching Questions of Free Speech  
Before delving into these cases, understanding how the Supreme Court considers speech 
questions is paramount. In recent years, The Supreme Court relied heavily on using the criteria 
set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism to evaluate if the government can constitutionally 
restrict speech. These principles include proving a compelling government interest, narrowly 
tailoring the law, leaving alternative channels of communication open and ensuring that the 
measure favors no viewpoint. While all these concepts appear in the following cases, it becomes 
clear that at different times, one of the aforementioned criteria may become more important than 
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the others. Therefore, the judicial ideological change resulted from a shift in the balance of the 
free speech identified by Ward v. Rock Against Racism between the years of 1994 and 2013. 
In all of the cases discussed, the justices clearly agree that buffer zones pass the test of 
being content-neutral as Chief Justice Roberts’ clarifies in his opinion, “We thus conclude that 
the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based” (Roberts McCullen v. Coakley). Roberts also 
acknowledges that buffer zones still give way for a dialogue between the protesters and the 
women entering the clinic. If the demonstrators can no longer approach a woman once she enters 
the zone, they can still get her attention by raising their voices. While it may not be as effective 
as beginning with a personal conversation, it remains a means by which pro-life advocates can 
voice their messages. This fact is in line with the Ward guideline, which demands the law leave 
ample opportunities for discussion.     
In McCullen v. Coakley, the need for the government to prove its compelling state interest 
in enacting a certain law and deciding whether the legislation is specific in addressing that 
interest occupies the most space in the justices’ argumentation. A more superficial glance at 
these cases might suggest that the justices concentrated most on if the legislatures created a law 
that was narrowly tailored to its purpose. This incorrect assumption could exist because state 
interest and the creation of narrowly tailored laws are undeniably linked in concept. However in 
this case, the focus was squarely on state interest because the principle question asked was: does 
Massachusetts have a compelling enough interest to enact this specific piece of legislation? The 
answer to this question did not depend upon the provisions of the law but upon the compelling 
nature of the government’s stated interest.  
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Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994) 
Women’s Health Center Inc. operated many abortion clinics around central Florida. In 
the beginning of the 1990’s the number of protestors around their facilities began to rise. 
Therefore, a state court prohibited “protesters from physically abusing those entering or existing 
the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic” (“Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center”). However, about 6 months later, the clinics wanted to expand the court’s order because 
of continued incidents. The state court then established an injunction, which consisted of a 36-
foot buffer zone and a 300-foot “no approach zone” around the clinic. In the “no approach zone”, 
demonstrators could neither approach women nor make noise and no protestor could cross the 
36-foot buffer zone.  The petitioner, Judy Madsen, challenged the constitutionality of this new 
law, claiming that it infringed upon her First Amendment right of speech. The Florida Supreme 
Court did not invalidate the buffer zone and so pro-life activists appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.  
In the oral arguments of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the judges’ line of 
questioning focuses heavily on trying to decide if the Florida injunction exhibited signs of 
viewpoint based regulation. The first question asked of the Plaintiff’s lawyer, Matthew Staver, 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist is “Why do you say it’s viewpoint-based, Mr. Staver”. Staver 
answered that. “Judy Madsen is restrained once she enters the 300-foot buffer zone. When she 
enters that zone, she can only speak if the listener favorably reacts to that speech…Judy 
Madsen’s speech at the abortion clinic is clearly on the issue of abortion”. The lawyer claims that 
because in the 300-foot “no approach” zone, the pro-life demonstrator can only engage with an 
individual if the patient initiates the encounter it restricts freedom of speech. Additionally, Staver 
argued that the 36-foot buffer zone limits Madsen’s First Amendment rights even further because 
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those who express pro-choice views cannot enter that zone at all, even if a woman entering the 
clinic expresses interest in the message of a demonstrator. 
 The Justices appear skeptical in accepting Staver’s interpretation of the injunction. Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor says, “I don’t think we’ve ever thought that injunctions of that type 
become content-based just because they were focused on a named individual, or group of 
individuals” Even Justice Antonin Scalia points out, in regards to the 36-foot buffer zone that, 
“You can’t say that that’s content-based because she can’t only go in if the people agree with 
her. She can’t go in at all.” Staver quickly responds that this restriction remains content-based 
because she is not allowed within the 36-foot zone, not because of her activities, but because of 
her beliefs. 
 In his Opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist first addresses “the petitioners’ 
contention that…because it is an injunction that restricts only the speech of antiabortion 
protesters, it is necessarily content or viewpoint based” (Rehnquist Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center). He immediately favors the clinic in this question by writing, “To accept petitioners’ 
claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based. An 
injunction by its very nature, applies only to a particular group...The fact that the injunction in 
the present case did not prohibit activities of those favoring abortion is…the lack of similar 
demonstrations” (Rehnquist Madsen v. Women’s Health Center).  
In another noteworthy portion of his opinion, Rehnquist briefly mentions the idea of 
sufficient government interest in limiting the protesters speech when he stated that, “The 36-foot 
buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway, on balance, burdens no more speech than 
necessary to accomplish the governmental interests in protecting access to the clinic” (Rehnquist 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center). Rehnquist continues in implying that the State has an 
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obvious interest in protecting “a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services 
in connection with her pregnancy” (Rehnquist Madsen v. Women’s Health Center). The Chief 
Justice does not dedicate much of his opinion in discussing compelling government interest 
because he believes it exists implicitly in the need for the injunction. Tellingly, he allots not a 
single sentence to proving the existence of government interest. Instead he simply states it as 
fact. Yet, he spends a large amount of time examining whether the law is content-neutral and 
narrowly tailored. Additionally, during the oral argument, no Justice questioned the lawyers 
regarding the presence or absence of compelling government interest and, in his dissent, Justice 
Scalia also does not overtly disagree with Rehnquist’s formulation that the government has a 
clear interest in passing this law. This evidence demonstrates the prevailing constitutional 
importance of other criteria over that of compelling government interest in evaluating the 
constitutionality of buffer zones. 
Ultimately in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the Court upheld the buffer zone law, 
not on the basis of government interest, but on the fact that the law proved both content-neutral 
and narrowly tailored. Compelling government interest served as a given rather than a question. 
However, once Hill v. Colorado came before the Supreme Court, a renewed focus arose: 
analyzing the restriction of speech based on significant governmental interest.   
Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
Colorado enacted a statute that made it “unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a 
health care facility’s entrance to knowingly approach within 8 feet of another person, without a 
person’s consent in order to pass a leaflet” (“Hill v. Colorado”). Many refer to this type of buffer 
zone as “floating” because it restricts the ability to approach the patient, rather than the clinic 
doorway. A demonstrator, named Leila Hill, challenged this law and the Colorado Court of 
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Appeals confirmed the constitutionality of the statute in accordance to the guidelines set forth in 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism. The Colorado Supreme Court denied review, so the plaintiffs 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, stating the legislation infringed upon free speech 
guarantees. 
The Supreme Court eventually decided that the government presented a compelling 
enough interest to curb the protesters’ speech, however, unlike in Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center, this idea emerges as an important question in the case. During the oral arguments, the 
court parses if government interest is great enough to justify the burden on pro-life demonstrators 
trying to utilize their First Amendment rights. After opening statements, Justice Ginsberg 
immediately points out, in regards to the 8-foot floating buffer zone, that. “You can speak 
anything you want at an 8-foot distance”. Justice Breyer follows up on Justice Ginsberg’s 
assertion by asking, “What speech is difficult for anyone to make when you’re about eight feet 
away, say, the distance between me and Justice Kennedy”. With these statements, the Justices 
question whether the floating buffer zone poses such an obstacle to free speech, that no amount 
of government interest justifies this Colorado statute.      
As the argument continues, important distinctions that relate to government interest arise. 
The plaintiff’s representative insists that the exact measure of the buffer zone holds no legal 
importance when he states, “I don’t think the difference between 15 feet and 8 feet would make 
the constitutionality any different. The standard is still the same”.  However, many of the Justices 
seem skeptical of his argument. Chief Justice Rehnquist responds by saying, “Perhaps the 
difference between 8 feet and 15 doesn’t, but if you got down to 3, feet, for example, it doesn’t 
seem to me there’s any message you can’t communicate at 3 feet”. Justice Scalia then expands 
this argument by asking, “What about 2 inches? I mean going nose to nose to someone. 
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Thrusting your head right in their face. Certainly that could be prohibited. That is intimidating 
behavior”. The notion that the exact measure of the buffer zone matters contributes directly to 
the argument of government interest. If a woman entering the clinic endures disturbing physical 
encroachment, rather than just the words and signs of the demonstrators, Colorado can more 
easily defend its interest in protecting its citizenry. Ultimately, the plaintiff’s representative 
claims that, even if the government had sufficient interest in enacting this legislation, the law 
itself needs to be more narrowly tailored when he argues, “the State’s concerns, the asserted 
interests here are to prevent intimidation, crowding and threatening conduct. The statute does not 
do that. They need to draft a statute that targets the precise concerns”.  
In these excerpts from the argument, the Justices debate the presence or absence of the 
criteria created in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. They discuss if the statute burdens the citizens’ 
ability to express their First Amendment privileges and if legislatures created a narrowly tailored 
law that does not impose a strain too drastic on guaranteed rights. However, the Justices engaged 
in these debates in order decide whether government interest serves as a valid reason for 
Colorado to enact this measure. For instance, does government interest, in this case, justify the 
burdens of the statute? Does the scope of the law rightly reflect the government’s interest? Many 
of the ideas debated in the chamber during Hill v. Colorado came back to the idea of compelling 
government interest, indicating its growing importance in free speech constitutional debate, 
especially in conjunction with its intellectual predecessor Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
which overlooked this idea entirely. Suddenly, government interest overtook content-neutrality 
as the Supreme Court’s as the more important constitutional concern. 
 Scalia’s dissent only solidifies this newfound attention to the existence of government 
interest because it serves as a focus of his dissent. In fact, he plainly writes, “This requires us to 
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determine, first, what is the significant interest the State seeks to advance?” (Antonin Scalia Hill 
v. Colorado). There is nothing in his dissent of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center that so clearly 
considers this idea.  In consideration of this question, he does not deny that the government had 
interest to enact this law, however, he argues that the significant governmental interest put forth 
by the Court was not mentioned by the State. Scalia mentioned the Opinion of the Court, written 
by Justice Stevens, where he identified the government’s compelling interest to “protect a 
citizen’s right to be left alone”, which he views as neither legitimate nor in congruence with the 
concerning statute (Antonin Scalia Hill v. Colorado). Scalia writes that, “Colorado has identified 
in the text of the statue itself the interest it sought to advance: to ensure that the State’s citizens 
may “obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner’...the interest that the 
Court makes the linchpin of its analysis was not…asserted by the State” (Antonin Scalia Hill v. 
Colorado). Scalia then describes the format of a large portion of his dissent, “I shall discuss 
below the obvious invalidity of this statue assuming, first (in Part A) the fictitious state interest 
that the Court has invented, and then (in Part B), the interest actually recited in the statute and 
asserted by the counsel for Colorado” (Antonin Scalia Hill v. Colorado). From this 
characterization of his qualms with the Opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia, for the first time in a 
case of reproductive health, identifies the Court’s understanding of governmental interest and 
refutes it.   
 In his rebuke of the Court’s decision, Scalia further addresses government interest, “the 
Court’s attempt to disguise the ‘right to be let alone’ as a ‘governmental interest in protecting the 
right to be let alone’ is unavailing for the simple reason that this is not an interest that may be 
legitimately weighed against the speakers’ First Amendment rights” (Antonin Scalia Hill v. 
Colorado). This portion of the dissent proves critical because he denies the existence of 
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governmental interest that the Court recognized in its majority opinion. In the second part of his 
disputation, Justice Scalia, does not overtly claim that the State had no interest in enacting this 
type of law, however, he claims that the statute, as it stood then, remained too broad, “the 8-Foot 
buffer zone attaches to every person on the public way or sidewalk within 100 feet of the 
entrance of a medical facility...so, the buffer zone would attach to any person within 100 feet of 
the entrance door of a skyscraper n which a single doctor occupied an office on the 18th floor.” 
(Antonin Scalia Hill v. Colorado). The above excerpts place Hill v. Colorado in between Madsen 
v. Women’s Health Center and McCullen v. Coakley in terms of intellectual lineage. Hill v. 
Colorado introduces the ideological shift that comes to fruition in McCullen v. Coakley. 
Although Scalia asks the question of ‘what is the compelling state interest in this case?’ he also 
dedicates the rest of his dissent to demonstrating how the law does not comply with the other 
Ward criteria as well. In this he indicates a growing important for the concept governmental 
interest but it is yet too be the deciding factor of the decision.  
The Opinion of the Court also no longer treats the question of compelling government 
interest as an obvious presence. Instead, it dedicates some text to defending its sufficiency, 
which allows for the upholding of this restrictive speech legislation. The trend of growing 
significance upon compelling government interest furthers in McCullen v. Coakley to such an 
extent that the Court unanimously decides in favor of the demonstrators’ and in direct conflict 
with its previous conclusions. 
McCullen v. Coakley (2013) 
In 2009, Massachusetts “created a 35-foot buffer zone around entrances, exists, and 
driveways of abortion clinics” (“Madsen v. Women’s Health Center”). The protesters, including 
Elenor McCullen, sued the state in federal district court claiming that the new buffer zone 
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infringed upon their right to free speech. The lower court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
Massachusetts law in relation to the guidelines codified in Ward v. Rock Against Racism. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals “affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had 
already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of 
abortion clinics” (“McCullen v. Coakley”). Yet, the Supreme Court upended precedent and 
declared the law unconstitutional.  
The oral arguments in McCullen v. Coakley begin with the question of the existence of 
compelling government interest when Justice Ginsberg asks, “The problem that the State faced is 
it doesn’t know...In advance who are the well-behaved people and who are the people who won’t 
behave well…So the Sate is trying to say, we want to make sure that the entrance is not blocked, 
and the only way we can do that is to have a rule that applies to everyone”. In this statement, 
Justice Ginsberg puts forth the State’s claim of compelling interest in order for the plaintiff’s 
lawyer, Mark Rienzi, to dispute it, instantly placing this idea at the forefront of the arguments. 
Rienzi responds by identifying the State’s claimed interest, “First, they say there are actual 
deliberate bad actors…and then secondly, the State says there is also some circumstances where 
there are enough people on the sidewalk that even lawful, consensual conversation might 
accidentally block the door”. Then Rienzi proceeds to discredit these interests as nonsufficient 
when he says, “To the extent the State is claiming that there are deliberate bad actors deliberately 
blocking the door, I don’t think that’s a very persuasive argument”. He describes the scene 
outside abortion clinics as perfectly lawful and says when the Police ask protestors to move, they 
follow these instructions. If they don’t, the Police arrest them. Rienzi also adds that, “Amicus 
United States has prosecuted, I think more than 45 of these cases and gotten more than 70 
convictions under that statute”. In this argument, Rienzi asserts that the claimed interest of the 
	   	   Blankman	  23	  
State is not sufficient because it addresses an imagined problem. The state has no interest where 
no issue exists.   
Justice Scalia, sustaining the importance of the presence of compelling government 
interest, asks, “Do you happen to know when was the last time that Massachusetts prosecuted 
somebody for obstructing entrance to an abortion clinic?” Rienzi responds with the answer, “I 
believe the last cite in the record that I’m aware of is, as of 1997”. Scalia confirms again, “And 
you say that only once, in 1997, that was the last time prosecution was brought?”. Justice 
Sotomayor picks up on her colleague’s line of questioning by asking, “But you do know that in 
the record there were more examples?” In this particularly telling section of the argument, the 
Justices try to discern how many deliberately malicious actors cause unruliness in front of 
abortion clinics in Massachusetts because the bigger the issue, the more interest the government 
can claim in wanting to remedy it with potentially restrictive legislation. 
The discussion of government interest heightens even further when those defending 
Massachusetts argued before the Court. The State’s representative, Ian Gershengorn, declares 
that the compelling governmental interest addressed by this statute is avoiding congestion in 
front of doorways in order to protect the safety of its patients and clinic workers. The Court again 
asks the lawyer questions to decide whether this alleged commotion outside of abortion facilities 
exists and therefore further legitimizes the compelling state interest argument. Justice Kennedy 
asks, “How many Federal prosecutions were brought in Massachusetts for physical obstruction 
under the Federal statute?”. Gershengorn offers the same answer as the plaintiff’s lawyer, 
discussed above. From the beginning of the arguments to the end, the bench stressed the 
importance of examining if the government had a truly compelling interest in creating this law.  
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Gabrielle Viator said “she was thrown off guard by the Justices’ line of questioning”. She 
expected that the Justices’ interrogation would focus on how much this law burdens speech and 
if the authors of the legislation wrote it narrowly enough to fit the needs of the state. Viator and 
her colleagues, while creating their case, focused on these issues by measuring the buffer zones 
at every angle and taking aerial shots of the perimeters, all to create a case that the statute did not 
burden speech and ample alternative options for communication remained available to the 
demonstrators. Yet, the Justices asked very little about this work. So instead of discussing the 
ease of which protesters can communicate their message with the buffer zone in tact, such as 
when Viator witnessed a pro-life activist approach a woman and successfully convince her to 
leave the Planned Parenthood, the Justices wanted to talk about the legitimacy of ‘congestion’ as 
a State interest.  
In a surprising decision, all nine justices ruled in favor of the protestors. In the Opinion of 
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, in direct opposition to judicial precedent, declared that the 
State’s interests did not justify creating a 36-Foot fixed buffer zone outside of abortion clinics in 
Massachusetts. Chief Justice Roberts specifically points to the lack of proof provided by the 
State demonstrating a persistent problem. He mentions a weekly gathering on Sundays of pro-life 
advocates outside of the Planned Parenthood on Commonwealth Avenue but  “The respondents 
point us to no evidence that individuals regularly gather at other clinics in sufficiently large 
groups to obstruct access” (John Roberts McCullen v. Coakley). For such a “small-scale issue”, 
Chief Justice Roberts does not believe the State has ground in enacting the law on the basis of 
government interest in preventing congestion (John Roberts McCullen v. Coakley).  
Additionally, in attempting to rebuke the existence of compelling governmental interest, 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the State’s reliance on the 1992 Supreme Court Decision in 
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Burson v. Freeman, which established 100-foot buffer zones outside polling places, in order to 
prevent campaign affiliates from soliciting votes (Harry Blackmun Burson v. Freeman). Roberts 
writes that, “Voter intimidation and election fraud are difficult to detect. Obstruction of abortion 
clinics and harassment of patients, by contrast, are anything but subtle” (John Roberts McCullen 
v. Coakley). In this reasoning, Chief Justice Roberts implies that the State cannot maintain its 
position of compelling government interest when law enforcement officials can easily discern 
between those acting legally and those who are not. Here the Chief Justice adds yet another 
hurdle to the State successfully arguing its case of compelling state interest, which did not exist 
previously.  
Analyzing the ways in which the Justices spoke and wrote about the First Amendment, 
specifically an individual’s right to free speech, over the course of the three cases clearly 
demonstrates an ideological shift.  In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the Court simply 
identified a governmental interest and let the state decide if it was compelling. In Hill v. 
Colorado, Scalia proposed the question: What is the significant interest Colorado wishes to serve 
and is it valid? In this inquiry, he foreshadows the direction of legal understanding of the First 
Amendment. Finally, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Supreme Court now demands that the State 
not only have a reason in creating a buffer zone but it must also prove this interest to be truly 
compelling. As evidence by the 2013 case, the government must convince the Court that its 
principle functions may become compromised unless it enacts a particular law restricting rights 
reserved for American citizens. The Supreme Court collectively raised the bar for governments 
to claim interest when restricting speech.   
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A Fair Consideration 
Injunction v. Statute 
In light of the evidence provided above, no easy explanation exists to puzzles that include 
the complexities of the United States political and judicial systems. Therefore, other explanations 
could at least contribute to the different outcomes between the years of 1994 and 2013. For 
instance, the pieces of legislation disputed in the cases above did not incorporate the same 
language and they responded to different situations. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center focused 
on an injunction, which the American Bar defines as, “a court order, which requires parties to 
continue, or cease particular actions” (“Injunction”). Meanwhile, McCullen v. Coakley contested 
a Massachusetts statute, which the Oxford English Dictionary describes as “a written law passed 
by a legislative body” (“Statute”).  
Some might make the argument that Florida enacted an injunction because of disorder 
outside of the clinic, which caused tangible problems for both law enforcement officials and 
others in the vicinity of the facility. In contrast, the legislature created the Massachusetts statute 
because it fit their political agenda, rather than remedying a proven issue. For example, 
testimony in the Florida case involved clinic operators recalling specific moments in which the 
state interest of protecting vulnerable women was clear, including a time when during a surgical 
procedure, the doctor and patient could hear “singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, auto 
horns and sound amplification” (William Rehnquist Madsen v. Women’s Health Center).  
Even though officials in Massachusetts created a statute, rather than an injunction, the 
law still addressed similar problems outside of clinics. When Gabrielle Viator was writing the 
statement of agreed facts, she visited a clinic in Springfield. She remembered a man who paced 
around the clinic, while wearing a “They kill babies here” sandwich board, and shouting, with 
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sound amplifiers, at the top of his lungs. These noises could also easily be heard inside the health 
care facility. She also remembered a time when she toured the Planned Parenthood in Brookline 
on Good Friday and over fifty people stood outside the clinic with baby coffins in hand, 
forcefully engaging with women who passed. Fifty people standing together on a busy city street 
seems like a situation in which a state might respond with the passage of an injunction. What 
Viator witnessed cannot be considered vastly different from what happened in Madsen, so while 
different classifications of laws require their own type of consideration, in practical terms, no 
actual discrepancy exists. The Court failed to recognize this glaring inconsistency.  
Additionally, in Massachusetts a buffer zone law existed before the one addressed in 
2013, which “established a defined area with an 18-foot radius around the entrances and drives 
of facilities. Anyone could enter that area, but once within it, no one could knowingly approach 
within six feet of another person”, almost identical to the law debated in Hill v. Colorado. 
However, as the Attorney General of Massachusetts testified, “protesters violated the statute on a 
routine basis”. Viator also said that the police considered the first buffer zone statute 
unenforceable. Therefore the Massachusetts law, like an injunction, responded to instances in 
which protesters engaged in unlawful activities outside of health care facilities.  
Differences in Argumentation 
 Others might claim that state defense attorneys simply did a better job in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center than those in McCullen v. Coakley. This rebuke also has its merits. For 
in the former case, the state asserted its primary interest as protecting women. Meanwhile, the 
government lawyers in McCullen v. Coakley affirmed its main concern as “congestion”. The 
government has more of a compelling interest in defending the health and safety of its women, 
rather than easing traffic. Governments can perform their duties even if crowding exists outside 
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of health care centers, however if it does not protect half of its population, the state fails in its 
most fundamental function.   
 Yet, this explanation also does not prove sufficient enough to explain this paradox 
effectively. Although, to an outside observer, it may seem that congestion is a weaker argument 
than protecting women, the Court still validated it as a state concern in Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Center. Before mentioning the State interest of “protecting a woman’s freedom to seek 
lawful medical services or counseling in connection with her pregnancy”, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist affirmed that, “the asserted interests in public order” indeed met the requirements as a 
compelling government interest. So, although the lawyer in McCullen v. Coakley may have 
focused too much on the congestion problem, the Court still accepted it as a significant state 
interest in 1994. The inadequacy of these answers gives weight to my hypothesis because it 
accounts for most of the anomalies embedded within the cases.  
Beyond Buffer Zones 
In further defense of the ideological shift on the Court, this new free-speech pattern 
transcends the realm of reproductive health cases and government issued restrictions. It exists in 
other free speech cases decided by the Supreme Court during this time period, proving that the 
question cannot only be explained in specificities that only relate to the previous cases. For 
instance in Snyder v. Phelps, a case decided in 2011, just two years before McCullen v. Coakley, 
the Court exhibited its new ideology. This case concerned a man named Fred Phelps and his 
congregation at the Westboro Baptist Church, a group many Americans will recognize for its 
hate-fueled speech. To express their opposition of the acceptance of homosexual Americans in 
the military, they picketed funerals of fallen soldiers. Eventually the father of a deceased U.S. 
serviceman sued the protestors for causing him severe emotional distress. The demonstrators 
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than claimed this violated their First Amendment right to speech, in line with the buffer-zone 
cases.  
The Supreme Court ultimately decided in favor of the protestors, in line with what 
occurred in McCullen v. Coakley. This decision mirrors that of the Massachusetts case because 
the Court almost unanimously agreed, with only Justice Alito dissenting. The liberal voices of 
the Court voted in line with the likes of Justices Scalia and Thomas, the most conservative 
judges on the bench. In his Opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts admitted that regulating 
speech on public forums, such as sidewalks, “is not beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—
it is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions that are consistent with standards 
announced in this Court’s precedents” (John Roberts Snyder v. Phelps). Yet, he defended the 
bench’s decision to protect this particular instance of speech on a public forum, because as the 
representatives for the Westboro Baptist Church argued, “Outrageousness is a highly malleable 
standard” and therefore the demonstrators cannot be sued for inflicting emotional distress on 
Snyder after the death of his son (John Roberts Phelps v. Snyder). 
Yet, in his dissent, Justice Alito argues that valid legal claims exist to punish speech 
because of the emotional pain it causes others. Specifically, he mentions, “a very narrow tort 
with the requirements that ‘are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy...to recover, a plaintiff just show 
that the conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severe” (Samuel Alito Phelps v. Snyder). 
Justice Alito affirms that meeting the demands for this tort should be difficult, as to not infringe 
on the First Amendment too easily. However, he believes that the facts of this case comply with 
the tort’s stringent demands because the petitioners launched a malevolent verbal attack on 
Snyder’s family, hurling damaging insults such as “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” (Samuel Alito 
Snyder v. Phelps). Justice Alito points out that, “Although the elements of the tort are difficult to 
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meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were not 
satisfied here. On appeal, they chose not to contest the sufficiency of the evidence”, proving that 
they knew their actions could be declared illegal under the criteria of the tort. Justice Alito ended 
his dissent by simply stating that, “ The respondents’ outrageous conduct causes petitioner great 
injury”, sufficient enough to comply with the tort and he therefore disagreed with his colleagues.  
Justice Alito’s dissent provides the Court with a legal pathway to restricting speech, yet 
the others on the bench, including the liberal bloc, refused to do so. Although, not government 
speech, this case demonstrates an increased effort to defend the First Amendment against those 
that want to either restrict it or punish those that utilize it. The Court exhibits an especially high 
bar for restricting speech in the cases of McCullen v. Coakley and Phelps v. Snyder. Phelps v. 
Snyder exhibited the trend I discussed in terms of the reproductive health cases, outside of 
government-initiated statutes and abortion laws, which shows that this First Amendment change 
is not specific but a wide-ranging shift that could potentially affect all future free speech cases.  
The Supreme Court’s Effect on American Federalism 
Closely examining the arguments made in McCullen v. Coakley demonstrated to me that 
this case carries more than First Amendment implications. Instead, it brings into question exactly 
how much influence the Supreme Court has on local legislation. The Justices asked the state’s 
lawyer why the legislature chose to enact a 36-foot buffer zone. She in turn suggested that they 
choses these dimensions because of previous court decisions. She answers that, “We knew from, 
of course Madsen that 36-foot buffer zones were acceptable in—when you were being 
responsive to that kind of problem…so at some point or another, the legislature was aware that 
some amount of space needed to be created, and it chose 35 feet as a reasonable response, a 
reasonable amount of space around the facility” (McCullen v. Coakley). From the attorney’s 
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response, it seems that the legislature decided the specificities of this particular buffer zone law 
by precedents set by the Court. This reminded me that lawmakers do not legislate in a vacuum, 
only in service to their constituents. They act under an invisible but constant influence by the 
federal judiciary branch in not only the construction of laws but also in choosing to enact a piece 
of legislation at all. I wanted to investigate the extent of this unseen influence. Is the judicial 
pressure on legislatures so great that it imbalances the fundamental American constitutional ideal 
of federalism? Now that the Supreme Court declared the buffer zone in Massachusetts 
inadmissible in response to State concerns of public safety, how will this effect future legislation 
regarding speech, and, more specifically buffer-zone laws? 
The Power of the Judiciary 
The idea that the judiciary acts as covert policy-makers is not a new concern. In his 
discussion of the American judiciary, Alexander Hamilton tried to assuage this worry by 
explaining the extent of judicial power, “Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a 
capacity to annoy or injure them…the judiciary has no influence over the sword or the purse and 
can take no active resolution whatever (Alexander Hamilton Federalist Paper #78). He then 
proceeds to say that the court cannot control the country in terms of strength or will, instead it 
can simply offer judgment. Hamilton takes this notion even farther when he declares that the 
“The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can 
never attack with success; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it defend itself against 
their attacks” (Alexander Hamilton Federalist Paper #78). Throughout his life, Hamilton 
remained resolute in his belief that the Judiciary could not infringe upon the other branches by 
nature of its given capacity. In this belief, not only did Hamilton overlook some critical powers 
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given to the Supreme Court by Congress, he also failed to anticipate how the Supreme Court’s 
power would evolve over time. 
Writ of Certiorari 
One Supreme Court procedural power that remains shrouded form public view is that the 
United State Government allows its highest court to choose which cases it will hear, in order to 
serve the concept of judicial independence. Legal scholars refer to this process as granting writ 
of certiorari. The New York Times classifies this as the institution’s “most consequential—yet 
least appreciated—function” (Fischer). From approximately 8,000 petitions, the Justices choose 
about 75 and “an explanation for the court’s decision is almost never given, nor is it customary to 
indicate how the individual justices voted” (Fischer). This function proves incredibly important 
because it dictates national action on all levels of government.  
In terms of the research above, this secret power exerted by the Court in choosing its 
cases begged the question: Why did a majority of Justices choose to hear McCullen v. Coakley?  
The guidelines by which the Justices select their next cases are both vague and subjective. 
Article III of the Constitution grants “judicial Power to controversies between two or more State” 
(Article III, Section 2, Clause 1). Yet this still cannot explain the Court’s choice of McCullen v. 
Coakley as the dispute was geographically limited to a single state.   
A circuit split in which “two or more of the 13 United States courts of appeals have 
issued contradictory rulings on significant matters of federal law” increases a case’s chances of 
getting chosen by the nation’s highest Court (S.M). However, this reasoning behind the Supreme 
Court’s choice also does not fit with the Massachusetts case because there was no constitutional 
disagreement in the lower courts. The United States courts of appeals upheld the constitutionality 
of these protective laws around health care facilities offering abortions in Madsen v. Women’s 
	   	   Blankman	  33	  
Health Center, Hill v. Colorado and McMullen v. Coakley. Considering the lack of First 
Amendment controversy in previous decisions, the Supreme Court clearly had another reason for 
hearing this case, unbeknownst to the public.  
Gabrielle Viator felt a sense of uneasiness regarding the case when she found out that the 
Court granted McCullen v. Coakley writ of cert, “I was honestly shocked. There was no circuit 
split…we had Madsen, we had Hill. That was a red flag for me. The first indication that 
something was wrong.” Now knowing the outcome, the justices clearly wanted to rule on 
McCullen v. Coakley, not to weigh in on an ongoing and contentious legal debate, but to present 
a new understanding of these buffer zone laws because it believed that previous decisions 
incorrectly interpreted this type of legislation and its First Amendment justification. 
 Selecting this case also gave the American people an idea regarding the priorities of the 
bench. The Supreme Court demonstrated its belief in the constitutional importance of correcting 
perceived errors made in previous decisions. The justices had many reasons to leave McCullen v. 
Coakely off their upcoming agenda but they decided to pursue it anyway in a batch of 8,000 
petitions where only a handful can be chosen. No justice makes a meaningless selection, so 
therefore the bench wanted to hear this case because they had a revised understanding of free-
speech, which made it more difficult for the government to prove it had compelling interest in 
restricting this right. This particular case and its subsequent unanimous decision naturally 
influenced the actions of lawmakers, not only in Massachusetts, but also in other parts of the 
country, effectively altering local laws and diminishing the Federalist model embedded in the 
American framework. Compounding this, the Supreme Court made the decision itself to place 
this issue on the national stage.  
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Judicial Review 
Chief Justice Marshall defined the Court’s most predominate power: judicial review, 
which has grown in strength to such an extent that it may threaten the structure of American 
federalism. The constitution does not explicitly mention the notion of judicial review, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court judges the constitutional validity of a legislative act. Instead, the 
Opinion of the Court in Marbury v. Madison established this doctrine. When explaining its role 
in American constitutionalism, Marshall made certain not to frame this concept as a legislative 
role for justices, but that when a law is “repugnant to the constitution”, it cannot exist as the “law 
of the land” and the “courts…are bound by this instrument” (John Marshall Marbury v. 
Madison) 
No formula exists to determine if the Supreme Court should utilize its power of judicial 
review or, in more constitutionally ambiguous cases, show deference to a legislative body. 
Judicial deference is not a foreign concept. In fact, in cases regarding national security, “the 
judiciary exerts an extremely limited role” and exhibits deference to the executive branch 
because the President, by nature of his constitutionally granted functions, is privy to classified 
information that might contribute to the enactment of certain legislation (Fix and Randazzo 1). In 
doing this, the Court relinquishes its power of judicial review because the Executive serves as the 
most informed party in this specific situation. However, no tradition of deference exists when 
determining the legality of state-led legislation. A state undoubtedly knows more about the 
problems within its borders than a federal institution. Should there be a tradition of deference in 
these cases? The buffer zone law of Massachusetts did not contradict any piece of federal 
legislation nor did it affect those from other states. The legislature, in this case, served as the best 
entity to identify an issue and, in turn, resolve it with legislative measures. 
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 The Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley stated that she felt such 
disappointment after the Supreme Court’s ruling because she knows protesters scare women into 
not seeking help from these clinics, threatening the health of citizens. Coakley, like Viator, spent 
a lot of time at the clinics and witnessed the actual effects of the protesters’ presence. The Boston 
Globe interviewed women trying to enter the clinic and one patient expressed her fear, “You 
have to walk through this circle of people staring at you and talking to you and judging you. It’s 
very intimidating” (Allen and McNeill). Massachusetts state officials heard similar sentiments 
from women they spoke with and as a result, the state had a different idea than the Court of just 
how compelling its interest was in establishing the buffer zone.  
 In the case of McCullen v. Coakley, the state better understood that this law truly 
protected women during a vulnerable time. Viator explained to me that she thought the justices 
did not understand the humanity of this case. While it remains important to advocate for First 
Amendment Rights, in select situations when expressing that privilege risks another’s 
psychological health, Courts allow for certain limitations.  Therefore, the Courts do not have to 
separate the law from humanity. In fact Geoffrey Hazard Jr., a professor at Yale Law School, 
wrote that, “The human condition is what law and law practice address, or as they say these days, 
what law is ‘all about’” (Hazard 80). Maybe the Court could have recognized the humanity in 
these cases by trusting that the legislature enacted this law for the health and dignity of its 
citizens. I do not admonish the need for Supreme Court justices to review any case appealed to 
them, however I extend the thought that in situations like McCullen v. Coakley, justices might be 
better served putting a certain amount of trust in the legislature’s judgment.  
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Consequences of McCullen v. Coakley 
Massachusetts  
 The local consequences of the Supreme Court’s shift in First Amendment understanding 
materialized in Massachusetts almost instantly in its new legislation. Following the ruling, the 
state’s Attorney General Martha Coakley said that the state’s work “begins again” and “the state 
will look for a solution that meets the court’s requirements and protects everyone from 
harassment, threats and physical obstruction” (Barnes). Massachusetts failed to follow through in 
its promise. As a possible fix, Coakley initially offered the idea of “giving the attorney general 
more authority to fine and block individual protestors from clinics” (Scharfenberg). However, no 
one ever introduced this type of legislation. Eventually, Governor Deval Patrick signed into law 
An Act to Promote Public Safety and Protect Access to Reproductive Health Care Facilities. The 
provisions within this piece of legislation included limiting crowding at clinic doors, allowing 
“law enforcement officials to immediately disperse of a gathering”, and punishing those who 
engage in physically threatening acts. Unfortunately, none of these ideas adequately protect the 
women of Massachusetts.  
 The order allowing law enforcement to punish those physically hurting others does not 
provide more safety for women. The Police already have the ability to disband meetings outside 
clinics that become aggressive and arrest those who physically intimidate the women. Also as 
Gabe Viator asserted, threats of bodily harm never played an overwhelmingly large role in any of 
the buffer-zone cases. Therefore, this aspect of Massachusetts’ new legislation does not address a 
problem that explained the need for the original buffer zone law. Therefore, it does not remedy 
any hole created by the decision in McCullen v. Coakley in the ways Massachusetts ensures the 
security of its women.  
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 In terms of the law’s focus on keeping entryways open, The Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act (FACE), a federal law enacted by President Clinton in 1994, already stops the 
deliberate impediment of doorways, so this component of the new law does not add any 
supplemental protection. The government’s representative during the oral arguments of 
McCullen v. Coakley stated that “physical obstruction” was not the state’s only concern. 
Massachusetts asserted that a protestor does not need to stand directly in front of the door in 
order to make entry into the clinic “unreasonably difficult”. Therefore, this portion of the law 
does not shelter women from the real hindrances from accessing health care. In our conversation, 
Gabe Viator also confirmed the ineffectiveness of the FACE legislation in addressing access 
practically.  
 Martha Coakley claimed a year after the decision that “many women have had their 
access denied as a practical matter”, indicating that this new law did little in terms of increasing 
accessibility to health care (Semuels). Planned Parenthood seemed to agree with this assessment 
because shortly after the Supreme Court case, the organization announced that they “planned to 
train new patient escorts, volunteers who escort patients from their cars to a clinic” (Shoenberg). 
Planned Parenthood did not trust this new legislation to protect the women who rely on its 
services.  
 Instead of creatively rewriting another buffer-zone law, that did not overtly defy the 
Court’s ruling, Massachusetts made a feeble attempt to appease those worried about women’s 
safety outside clinics with this powerless piece of new legislation. Although, the Supreme Court 
declared the Massachusetts law null and void, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion did not overtly 
overturn their conflicting decision in Hill v. Colorado or Madsen v. Women’s Health Center. If 
the State wanted to demonstrate its belief in the necessity of buffer zones, in spite of the 
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McCullen v. Coakely’s outcome, it could have established a 6-foot floating buffer zone within 
20-feet of the clinic and given the police ample power to enforce any apparent transgressions, yet 
Massachusetts made no such attempt. Massachusetts’ willingness to accept the Supreme Court’s 
ruling and refusing to legislate around the decision demonstrates the ideological understanding of 
the Courts influencing an autonomous state’s actions.  
Beyond Massachusetts 
 This apparent judicial influence was not limited to Massachusetts. Prior to the ruling in 
McCullen v. Coakley, many, traditionally liberal states in the Northeast had buffer zone laws in 
the works. Yet, after the adversary decision, New Hampshire chose not to enforce its buffer 
zone. Therefore, when Protestors challenged this functionally useless law in 2014, “a federal 
appeals court upheld the New Hampshire law establishing buffer zones, ruling that until a clinic 
actually imposes a buffer zone, it has no case to act on it” (Solomon). Concurrently, “the city of 
Burlington Vermont decided to stop enforcing parts of an ordinance prohibiting people from 
demonstrating outside of clinics” (Semuels). Prohibiting protestors from blocking the doors 
serves as the only aspect of the law that remains in tact. The fact that the Northeast complied so 
quickly with the Court’s judgment and did not try to create alternative laws, which bypass certain 
aspects of the Massachusetts buffer zone that the bench rejected as not serving the State’s 
interest, seems unusual. Normally, especially for States that have a history of support for 
women’s reproductive health, one might expect them to fight the system legislatively. After all, 
the decision in McCullen v. Coakley did not overtly overturn the buffer zones in Colorado or 
Florida. However, their lack of eagerness to do anything further indicates that the constitutional 
thinking of the Supreme Court has consequences, which extend beyond the state in which the 
overturned legislation originated. Instead, it’s ideological influence spreads around the country, 
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causing certain States to undertake or reject legislative action in an unexpected way. This 
situation serves as an example of the Judiciary threatening the nation’s federalist make-up.  
Implications 
 After the most recent election, topics of female reproductive rights, federalism, freedom 
of speech, partisanship and the role of the judiciary became evermore important because they 
now sit at the forefront of political debates. In terms of federalism, one interesting implication 
that arose from my research is questioning whether people rightly associate the Republican Party 
as the champion of states’ rights. The current administration seems to want to uphold this label, 
exemplified by when President Trump’s Press Secretary referred to transgender rights as “a 
states’ rights issue”, defending its decision to rescind federal affirmation in support of students 
using whichever bathroom matches their gender identities. However, my research, which focused 
on whether the judiciary serves as a threat to the federalist make-up of the United States, 
enforced the idea that there will be an increased importance for Democrats to ensure that power 
remains vested in the States.   
 Historically, “since the 1930s, progressives have unapologetically embraced Hamiltonian 
big government” but more recently many liberals want to “return to a tradition of ‘progressive 
federalism’ that they favored before the New Deal and the Great Society” (Rosen). However, 
after President George W. Bush’s election, in which the Republicans controlled both houses of 
Congress, Democrats reverted to a new kind of federalism. Heather K Gerken declares that, “it is 
a mistake to equate federalism’s past with its future. State and local governments have become 
sites of empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters, the groups progressives believe have 
the most to fear from decentralization” (Gerken). The Republicans dominate Washington yet 
again and therefore, Democrats must assert their influence elsewhere, specifically in the States. 
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Many Governors have began this push, especially in terms of immigration, in which a few cities 
in liberal states declared themselves “sanctuary cities”, where law enforcement will not hand 
over illegal immigrants for deportation.  
 I understand the arguments of political commentators and journalists, who believe that 
the Democrats’ new openness to states’ rights is hypocritical because now that President Trump 
is in charge, it suits them. However, the Democratic idea of progressive federalism began with 
President Bush but did not end during the Obama Presidency. In fact, President Obama seemed 
to support it. Specifically, the Obama administration paved the way for states to set their own 
limits of green house gas emissions. Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of constitutional law at New 
York University Law School, said he considered the decision to be “quite significant” and it 
showed “the Obama administration’s more benign view of government intervention”, which 
“may indicate a spirit of cooperative federalism” (Schwartz). Therefore, the idea of progressive 
federalism did not emerge because of opposition to President Trump. Instead, it has been a 
consistent trend in the Democratic Party. This direction of modern Democrats shows a 
willingness to concede certain issues to the realm of states’ rights, in order to push their 
legislation forward. There increasing 
 Actions of progressive federalism in the Supreme Court, such as increasing the 
transparency of the case selection process and establishing certain limitations to judicial review, 
will not impact the prevailing strength of the federal government, nor should it. The impulsion of 
States outside of Massachusetts to follow the judicial conclusions in the 2013 buffer zone case 
implies that the ideological understanding of the Court holds sway over legislatures, even if they 
are not legally compelled to comply with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a law. I believe it 
is critical to make this point clear in light of the recent presidential attacks on the independent 
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judiciary by questioning the integrity of individual justices, referring to a judge who invalidated 
an Executive Order as “a so-called judge”. Progressive federalism neither advocates for federal 
submission nor does it imperil its existence.  
 My research suggests further implementation of restrictions upon female reproductive 
rights. The election of President Donald Trump, who identified himself as a pro-life candidate, 
increases the visibility of the abortion question because many pro-life activists see an 
opportunity to further restrict access. The increased interest in this issue is not limited in its 
scope. In front of a clinic in New York City, on a typical day, “only two protesters stood outside 
Choices Women’s Medical Center” but since the election, “aggressive protesters have been 
flocking to the clinic” (Pattani). 
 Viator expressed concern that because the nation has a new President, who expressed 
extreme views in approaching the abortion question, including punishing woman that choose the 
procedure, pro-life demonstrators will perceive their beliefs as mainstream. This will only lead to 
more protesters outside of health care facilities and now because of the most recent Supreme 
Court decision, states show reluctance to enforce buffer zones. I feel that this lack of rules in 
restricting the protester’s direct access to the women will only increase their aggressive behavior. 
Pro-life activists will have even less respect for the women’s personal space while entering a 
health center.  
 As a result of my research, which indicated that the states legislate with a consideration 
of federal constitutional understanding, I do not expect liberal states to enforce their protective 
measures outside of clinics for a long time. In addition, traditionally conservative states may 
view the 2013 decision as their license to strip protections from centers that offer abortion 
services. Therefore, organizations, such as Planned Parenthood, will depend less on federal 
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entities for legislative protection and take it into its own hands. In order to respond to this loss of 
governmental help, along with an increasing number of protesters outside of clinics, I also think 
that pro-choice activists will demonstrate alongside their counterparts, expressing their positions 
as well. However, naturally concerns arise regarding this increased activity because it will not 
help the psyche of the patients who are seeking help during an exceptionally vulnerable time. 
 The increased intensity in speech will not be limited to the issue of female reproductive 
health. The nation is experiencing individuals who want to see how far they can push boundaries 
of their First Amendment rights and the Supreme Court exhibited in McMullen v. Coakley that 
they will do little to restrict it. For that reason, “political figures” like Milo Yiannopoulos, a 
conservative commentator, suddenly have a platform to say offensive things unabashedly, such 
as leading a racist abuse campaign against a black actress. In contrast, those advocating for 
further confinements on the First Amendment will be disappointed because if the justices 
showed such unwillingness to establish restrictions on speech when it directly impacts vulnerable 
people, they will most certainly not curb it in other less invasive situations.  
Conclusion 
 The responsibility of policing hateful and potentially dangerous speech will therefore lie 
in other places than the Court. The press has the obligation to report instances of vicious speech, 
but in the absence of judicial and consequently legislative action, the citizenry must serve as the 
ultimate judges and express condemnation to those who engage in this rhetoric. Such disapproval 
can manifest itself in respectful conversations with those who disagree, or by making a statement 
in the voting booth. Either way, when invalidating the buffer zone law in 2013, the Supreme 
Court made clear that the manner by which we interact with each other regarding matters of 
controversy is up to the American people. Citizens must now decide what speech can be 
	   	   Blankman	  43	  
considered so hurtful that it imperils their neighbors in their personal pursuit of happiness. I 
maintain a positive outlook for the future of this nation, the history of America proves that 
movements do not begin with Supreme Court justices nor do they happen in the halls of 
Congress, but they occur first in the hearts and minds of people.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	   Blankman	  44	  
Works Cited 
Allen, Evan and Claire McNeill. “Abortion battle spills across line at Boston clinics.” The 
Boston Globe, 29 June 2014. https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/06/28/protesters-
gather-planned-parenthood-clinic-first-saturday-after-supreme-court-ruling-against-
buffer-zone/TkOlnXO5G6HSFlfZ9XB3NK/story.html. Accessed 17 Mar. 2017.  
“Buffer Zones.” National Abortion Federation, https://prochoice.org/education-and-
advocacy/violence/buffer-zones. Accessed 2 Jan. 2017.  
Barnes, Robert. “Court Strikes Down Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones.” The Washington Post, 26 
June 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-strikes-down-abortion-clinic-
buffer-zones/2014/06/26/99937cca-f1b4-11e3-914c-
1fbd0614e2d4_story.html?utm_term=.ed277890094b. Accessed 26 Feb. 2017.  
Burson v. Freeman. United States Supreme Court. 26 May 1992. Justia: US Supreme Court. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/504/191/case.html. Accessed 10 December 
2016.  
Carmon, Irin. “Ginsberg defends decision on abortion clinics’ buffer zones.” MSNBC, 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ginsburg-defends-abortion-buffer-clinic-zone-decision. 
Accessed 15 Nov. 2016.  
Casper, Jonathan. “The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.” The American Political 
Science Association, vol. 70, no.1, Mar. 1976, pp. 50-63. JSTOR, doi: 10.2307/1960323. 
Fisher, Jeffrey L. “The Supreme Court’s Secret Power.” The New York Times, 24 Sept. 2015. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/opinion/the-supreme-courts-secret-
power.html?_r=0. 1 Mar. 2017.   
	   	   Blankman	  45	  
Fix, Michael P. and Kirk A. Randazzo. “Judicial Deference and National Security: Applications 
of the Political Question and Act of State Doctrines” Democracy and Security, 16 Mar. 
2010, pp. 1-16. http://people.cas.sc.edu/randazzo/fix_randazzo_2010_dem_and_sec.pdf. 
Accessed 2 Feb. 2017.  
Gerken, Heather K. “A New Progressive Federalism.” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, no.24, 
2012. http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism. Accessed 
8 Mar. 2017.  
Glick, Henry Robert. “Policy-Making And State Supreme Courts: The Judiciary as an Interest 
Group.” Law & Society Review, vol.5, no. 2, Nov. 1970, pp. 271-292. JSTOR. doi: 
10.2307/3053038. 
Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 68.” Congress Resources, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Resources+A+to+Z. Accessed 12 
Dec. 2016.  
Hazard Jr., Geoffrey C. “Humanity and the Law.” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, vol. 
16, 2004, pp. 79-85. 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1284&context=yjlh. 
Accessed 1 Mar. 2017.  
Hill v. Colorado. United States Supreme Court. 28 June 2000. Justia: US Supreme Court. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/530/703/case.html. Accessed 4 December 
2016.  
Hutcherson, Kimberly. “A brief history of anti-abortion violence” CNN, 1 Dec. 2015. 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/30/us/anti-abortion-violence. Accessed 7 Mar. 2017.  
	   	   Blankman	  46	  
Latson, Jennifer. “How an Abortion-Clinic Shooting Led to a ‘Wrongful Life’ Lawsuit.” TIME 
Magazine. http://time.com/3648437/john-salvi-shootings. Accessed 12 Mar. 2017.  
Lens, Vicki. “The Supreme Court, Federalism, and Social Policy: The New Judicial Activism.” 
Social Service Review, vol. 75, June 2001, pp. 318-335. Columbia University Libraries, 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:153469.  
Marbury v. Madison. United States Supreme Court. 24 Feb. 1803. Justia: US Supreme Court. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/case.html. Accessed 14 Mar. 2016.  
McCullen v. Coakley. United States Supreme Court. 26 June 2014. Justia: US Supreme Court. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/12-1168/opinion3.html. Accessed 4 
December 2016.  
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center. United States Supreme Court. 30 June 1994. Justia: US 
Supreme Court. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/512/753/case.html. Accessed 
4 December 2016.  
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center. United States Supreme Court. 30 June 1994. OYEZ. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/512/753/case.html. Accessed 4 December 
2016.  
Pattani, Aneri. “Threats at abortion clinics rise since Trump’s election.” CNBC, 15 Dec. 2016. 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/15/abortion-providers-see-increased-threat-since-trumps-
election.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile. Accessed 15 Mar. 
2017.  
Rodriguez, Lucas. “The Troubling Partisanship of the Supreme Court.” Stanford Political 
Journal, 7 Jan. 2016. https://stanfordpolitics.com/the-troubling-partisanship-of-the-
supreme-court-da9fd5a900ac. Accessed 5 Jan. 2017.   
	   	   Blankman	  47	  
Rosen, Jeffrey. “The Court and Democracy.” PBS. 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/history.html. Accessed 17 Mar. 2017.  
Rossum, Ralph A. “The Seventeenth Amendment and the Death of Federalism.” The 
Philadelphia Society, 3 Oct. 2003. http://phillysoc.org/rossum-the-seventeenth-
amendment-and-the-death-of-federalism. Accessed 12 Feb. 2107.   
Ruane, Kathleen Ann. “Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment.” 
Federation of American Scientists, 8 Sep. 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf. 
Accessed 2 Jan. 2017. http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-
laws-struck-down-20140707-story.html.  
Rubin, Alvin B. “Judicial Review.” Louisiana Law Review, vol. 40, no.1, 1979, pp. 67-82. 
Louisiana State University. Accessed 17 Mar. 2017.  
S.M. “How the Supreme Court chooses its cases.” The Economist, 24 Feb. 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/economist-explains-19. 15 
Mar. 2017. Accessed 28 Feb. 2017.  
Samuels, Alana. “Abortion buffer zone laws begin after Supreme Court Ruling.” Los Angeles 
Times, 7 July 2014. http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-
laws-struck-down-20140707-story.html. Accessed 15 Feb. 2017.   
Scharfenberg, David. “Coakley, Patrick press for new abortion clinic protections.” Boston Globe, 
2 July 2014. http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2014/07/02/coakley-patrick-
outline-response-buffer-zone-ruling/HfYhaoOccfdH5hcVFUtQcP/story.html 
 
Schoenberg, Shira. “Planned Parenthood looks to patient escorts, increased law enforcement 
after U.S. Supreme Court strikes down abortion clinic buffer zone.” Mass Live.	  
	   	   Blankman	  48	  
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/06/planned_parenthood_looks_to_pa.ht
ml. Accessed 26 June 2017. 
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/06/planned_parenthood_looks_to_pa.ht
ml. Accessed 5 Dec. 2016.  
Schwartz, John. “Obama shows openness to broader role for states.” The New York Times, 30 
Jan. 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/americas/30iht-
30federal.19809671.html. Accessed 9 Feb. 2017.  
Snyder v. Phelps. United States Supreme Court. 2 Mar. 2011. Justia: US Supreme Court. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/562/09-751/opinion.html. Accessed 14 
December 2016.  
Solomon, Dave. “Appeals court upholds abortion clinic buffer zones.” New Hampshire Union 
Leader, 2017 Jan. 11. http://www.unionleader.com/crime/Appeals-court-upholds-
abortion-clinic-buffer-zones-01122017. Accessed 20 Mar. 2017.   
“Statute” Oxford English Dictionary. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/statute. 14 Feb. 
2017.  
Treanor, William Michael. “Judicial Review Before Marbury.” Georgetown University Law 
Center, 2005. 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2040&context=facpub
. Accessed 5 Mar. 2017.  
U.S. Constitution. Art. III, Sec. 3. 
“Understanding Injunctions.” American Bar, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/14/winter-
2014/understanding-injunctions.html. Accessed 14 Feb. 2017.  
	   	   Blankman	  49	  
Ward v. Rock Against Racism. United States Supreme Court. 22 June 1989. Justia: US Supreme 
Court. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/491/781/case.html. Accessed 14 
December 2016.  
Wilson, Joshua C. The Street Politics of Abortion: Speech, Violence and America’s Culture 
Wars. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2013.  
Yoo, John. “Judicial Review and Federalism.” Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, vol. 22, 1 
Jan. 1998, pp. 197-203. Berkley Law: University of California. 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1489&context=facpubs. 
Accessed 6 Mar. 2017.  
 	  
